

AER

2000-9986

**SECRET**

AUG 17 1953

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt  
Chief, SR

ATTN: KAPOK/Murdoch

KAPOK/AEROSPACE  
Meeting with CASSOWARY 2.

1. The undersigned conferred with CASSOWARY 2 during the late afternoon and early evening hours of 8 August 1953 and discussed matters pertaining to CASSOWARY 2's trip to Germany. Our plan for concurrent release of CASSOWARY directives to CAVATINA 1 and JAVELIN was outlined. CASSOWARY 2 agreed to the specific material for release, but felt that we should not inform JAVELIN until after his conference with CAVATINA 1 to prevent the possibility of CAVATINA 1's receiving an advance warning. CASSOWARY 2 was advised to discuss the matter of final release with CASSO representatives after he had evaluated the situation in Germany. CASSOWARY 2, before arranging a meeting with CAVATINA 1, plans to scout out individuals like CAVATINAS 3, 10, and 14.

According to the latest reports, the number of hard-core CAVATINA 1 supporters has decreased to a mere handful, as the majority have either joined the "new opposition" or are on the verge of doing so. Therefore, should CAVATINA 1 decide to oppose or challenge the CASSOWAY mandate, he will receive little support from the other high-level politicians whose stand has an important influence on the general CAVATINA membership.

2. CASSOWARY 2 has agreed that the problem would be fairly simple were CAVATINA 1 to accept the CASSOWAY instructions. In this event, CAVATINA 1 would have to write a message for transmission over the JAVELIN link ordering CAVATINA 11 to recoordinate himself to CASSOWAY headquarters. This would place CASSOWAY's end of the JAVELIN link in the hands of the same people now controlling the CASSOWAY end of the XMARK link. CASSOWARY 2 feels that CAVATINA 11 would be given a court martial and, in view of the seriousness of his subversive activities, would very probably be executed. The H/T link with JAVELIN would be taken over by CASSOWAY headquarters for use as they see fit.

EE

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DATE 2007

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3. The undersigned then stated that, should CAVATINA 1 refuse to follow the CAMPOURS instructions, JAVELIN would feel themselves obliged to give his own support in order to protect their own interests. They would undoubtedly stress the value of an existing intelligence net in a strategic area of CAMPOURS territory and deny the existence of any diversionary activity on the part of their team. The undersigned pointed out that, had we received valuable intelligence reports from the CAMPOURS headquarters, we would be in a much stronger position to counter any JAVELIN arguments for the continuance of their present operations. JAVELIN would be hard pressed to justify the support of a schismatic group when there exists a bona fide link with the top leaders of the entire resistance movement, producing intelligence of vital interest to the West.

CASSOWARY 2 agreed that upon his arrival in Germany he would discuss with CASSOWARY 3 the whole matter of procuring intelligence in the immediate future from the underground leaders. The undersigned also pointed out that the confirmation of the CASSOWARY mandate will draw the attention of high-ranking officials in our organization who will then raise questions embarrassing for the undersigned to answer, vis. what has CAMPOURS produced over the four-year period that they have been receiving our support? Exactly who are the leaders in CASSOWARY etc. There is no doubt in the undersigned's mind that CASSOWARY 2, who was already aware of our position towards intelligence production, understood the significance of this argument.

4. CASSOWARY 2 was informed that sometime this Fall control of U/T traffic with CAMPOURS will be transferred to KUMAK and he was requested to arrange with CASSOWARY 3 to assume the latter's role in handling future U/T traffic.

5. CASSOWARY 2 was also requested to discuss with CASSOWARY 3 recruitment for 1954 operations, since a dispatch this Fall would leave us with no trainees on hand.

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RES:gc(17 August 1953)

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